How the US Department of Defence Expects to Protect Weapons from Cyber Attacks? | Security Risks Asia Made with Humane Club

How the US Department of Defence Expects to Protect Weapons from Cyber Attacks?

Published Oct 10, 2018
Updated Jul 02, 2020

United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) in a Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate has outlined the challenges that are faced in securing the cyber component of weapons systems which assumes importance given the extensive controls through computer chips in modern platforms.

See Original Report Here

The GAO states in the Report that the  Department of Defense (DOD) faces mounting challenges in protecting its weapon systems from increasingly sophisticated cyber threats due to the computerized nature of weapon systems. It is only recently that the DOD has commenced actions to prioritize weapon systems cyber security even as  DOD weapon systems are more software dependent and more networked than ever before.

Even as the DOD plans to spend about $1.66 trillion to develop its current portfolio of major weapon systems, adversaries are developing advanced cyber-espionage and cyber-attack capabilities that target DOD systems. Thus it is necessary to protect systems through cybersecurity—the process of protecting information and information systems which can reduce the likelihood that attackers are able to access our systems and limit the damage if they do.

The report goes on to add that automation and connectivity are fundamental enablers of DOD’s modern military capabilities. However, they make weapon systems more vulnerable to cyber attacks. Although GAO and others have warned of cyber risks for decades, until recently, DOD did not prioritize weapon systems cybersecurity. Finally, DOD is still determining how best to address weapon systems cybersecurity.

As per the Report in operational testing, DOD routinely found mission-critical cyber vulnerabilities in systems that were under development, yet program officials GAO met with believed their systems were secure and discounted some test results as unrealistic. Using relatively simple tools and techniques, testers were able to take control of systems and largely operate undetected, due in part to basic issues such as poor password management and unencrypted communications. In addition, vulnerabilities that DOD is aware of likely represent a fraction of total vulnerabilities due to testing limitations. For example, not all programs have been tested and tests do not reflect the full range of threats.

DOD has recently taken several steps to improve weapon systems cybersecurity, including issuing and revising policies and guidance to better incorporate cybersecurity considerations. DOD, as directed by Congress, has also begun initiatives to better understand and address cyber vulnerabilities. However, DOD faces barriers that could limit the effectiveness of these steps, such as cybersecurity workforce challenges and difficulties sharing information and lessons about vulnerabilities. To address these challenges and improve the state of weapon systems cybersecurity, it is essential that DOD sustain its momentum in developing and implementing key initiatives. GAO plans to continue evaluating key aspects of DOD’s weapon systems cybersecurity efforts.

GAO was asked to review the state of DOD weapon systems cybersecurity. This report addresses (1) factors that contribute to the current state of DOD weapon systems’ cybersecurity, (2) vulnerabilities in weapons that are under development, and (3) steps DOD is taking to develop more cyber resilient weapon systems.

To do this work, GAO analyzed weapon systems cybersecurity test reports, policies, and guidance. GAO interviewed officials from key defense organizations with weapon systems cybersecurity responsibilities as well as program officials from a non-generalizable sample of nine major defense acquisition program offices.

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